TIME: Almanac 1995

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<text id=89TT0366> <title> Feb. 06, 1989: Nicaragua:Sending Signals--Or Smoke? </title> <history> TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1989 Feb. 06, 1989 Armed America </history> <article> <source>Time Magazine</source> <hdr> WORLD, Page 46 NICARAGUA Sending Signals -- or Smoke? </hdr><body> In an interview with TIME, Ortega says he's ready to make peace and compromise on virtually all U.S. complaints Of all the legacies Ronald Reagan bequeathed to George Bush, few are as vexing as Nicaragua. Stripped of all its rhetoric, the Reagan Administration's policy was entirely geared to overthrowing the Sandinista regime. Put simply, it made no sense to negotiate with the Marxist-Leninist Sandinistas when the only deal the U.S. wanted was their abdication. And besides, they couldn't be trusted to live up to any agreement. Eight years, $250 million and one contra army later, the Sandinistas are still in power. It was one of Reagan's starkest foreign policy failures, producing neither a military victory nor a diplomatic breakthrough. Daniel Ortega, the President of Nicaragua, has good reason to be optimistic that things may be different under George Bush. The expectation in foreign policy circles is that instead of trying to make Ortega cry uncle, the Bush Administration -- by necessity as much as by choice -- will approach Nicaragua with something less drastic in mind than toppling its government. In large part, that will happen because the contras are in suspended animation, not demobilized but with little hope of renewed military aid from the U.S. Instead, the U.S. will put its weight behind the 18-month-old Arias peace plan, as well as explore the possibility of direct talks with the Sandinistas. The prospect of a new breeze was not lost on Managua. Last week, in interviews lasting four hours with TIME correspondent John Moody, Ortega seized the initiative to strike chords that sounded, and were doubtless carefully designed to sound, as conciliatory toward the U.S. as any during the Sandinistas' ten-year tenure. His overall goal, Ortega said, is to "clear the ground" and "normalize all aspects of U.S.-Nicaraguan relations." Ortega asserts his willingness to reach compromise on virtually all the complaints the U.S. has voiced over the years. Near the top of the list has been the size of Nicaragua's armed forces. The U.S. contends that the Sandinistas' 70,000-member standing army is much bigger than necessary for legitimate defense and that it looms as a threat to other countries in the region. Ortega claimed he has already cut back his troops by 10,000 and reduced the state security police by 6,000. Nicaragua has also slashed one-third of its security budget, from $180 million this year to $127 million in 1990. If Washington feels further reductions are necessary, added Ortega, "we're ready to discuss the size of all the armies of the region and look for a way to reduce them." Ortega insisted that the ranks of Cuban military advisers in Nicaragua, estimated by Washington to number some 8,000, have been thinned. He said the number of Cubans has fallen from "hundreds, not thousands" to "dozens." Further reductions, he suggested, would be tied to the departure of several hundred U.S. military personnel in Honduras and El Salvador. That amounts to no small condition, but the continued presence of U.S. advisers in Central American countries that are allies of Washington would also be prohibited under the regional peace plan devised by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias Sanchez and signed in 1987 by five heads of state. Ortega was fully alert to one of the Bush Administration's subtle tip-offs on Central American policy. Noting that Secretary of State James Baker said during his Senate confirmation hearings that "the contras could not be completely abandoned," Ortega commented, "He didn't mention resuming lethal aid to them. We understand -what he meant." As for the contras, the Nicaraguan President offered a welcome to any who want to return home without a requirement that they accept an amnesty. That was a sop to rebels who resent any notion of a pardon for their political beliefs. Ortega seemed to take special pains to soft-pedal his Marxist ideology. "Now is not the time to establish socialism," he said. "We're convinced that our model should not be the countries of Eastern Europe or Cuba." The proper example for Nicaragua, he went on, would be the Scandinavian countries. "They're small, they have a heavy emphasis on social programs, the state has a role in the economy, but so does the private sector." To appease his domestic critics, Ortega promised important reforms: no more confiscation of private property, internationally supervised elections in 1990, no more censorship of the opposition press except for the controversial Radio Catolica and one other religious station. "In other words," said Ortega, "things stop here." Why should Bush take this overture seriously? Ortega has offered most of these guarantees and concessions in the past. None have fostered real pluralism in Nicaragua or lessened the Sandinistas' monopoly grip on power. On several occasions when the U.S. has edged back from confrontation with Nicaragua, Ortega has seemed to react with utter contempt. Few will forget that the Nicaraguan leader brazenly turned up in Moscow four days after the U.S. Congress voted to cut off military assistance to the contras in 1985. Yet there just may be a chance that Ortega, for a change, is serious about delivering on at least some of his promises. His country is in a major economic and political mess. The only way out of it is to end the U.S.-imposed trade embargo, diplomatic isolation and war. Ortega seems ready to put U.S. good intentions to the test. If he too really means what he says and is not simply blowing smoke, then it is possible that he is finally ready for serious diplomacy. </body></article> </text>